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Evidentiary Incommensurability 
A PRELIMINARY EXPLORATION OF THE PROBLEM 
OF REASONING FROM GENERAL SCIENTIFIC DATA 
TO INDIVIDUALIZED LEGAL DECISION-MAKING 
David L. Faigman† 
INTRODUCTION 
Scientists typically study variables at the population 
level, and most of their methodological and statistical tools are 
designed for this kind of work. The trial process, in contrast, 
ordinarily concerns whether a particular case is an instance of 
the general phenomenon. As I have previously observed, 
“[w]hile science attempts to discover the universals hiding 
among the particulars, trial courts attempt to discover the 
particulars hiding among the universals.”1 This essential 
difference in perspective between what scientists normally do 
and what the trial process is ordinarily about has yet to be 
studied with any degree of rigor—by scientists or lawyers.2 Yet 
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 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN 
THE LAW 69 (1999). 
 2 One exception to this yawning silence is the work of Joseph Sanders, who 
provides a careful examination of this issue in this volume. See generally Joseph 
Sanders, Applying Daubert Inconsistently? Proof of Individual Causation in Toxic Tort 
and Forensic Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367 (2010). In addition, the statistical 
challenges associated with individualizing group data have been examined with 
considerable sophistication in the context of predictions of violence. See, e.g., Stephen 
D. Hart et al., Precision of Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments: Evaluating the 
‘Margins of Error’ of Group v. Individual Predictions of Violence, 190 BRIT. J. 
PSYCHIATRY s60 (2007); Douglas Mossman, Analyzing the Performance of Risk 
Assessment Instruments: A Response to Vrieze and Grove, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 279, 
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this phenomenon is endemic to virtually every context in which 
law and science meet. Indeed, it might be said to be the single 
greatest obstacle to the law’s rational use of science.3 
The challenges associated with individualizing science, 
however, are not unique to the law. In fact, in a wide variety of 
social contexts, empirical research exploring general 
phenomena are sought to be applied reliably to individual 
cases. In medicine, for example, research on the effectiveness of 
various cancer therapies will inform a particular patient’s 
decision regarding which therapy to choose. In meteorology, 
research on hurricanes will inform a governor’s decision 
regarding whether to evacuate a particular city. Indeed, all 
applied science potentially presents the problem of making 
decisions about discrete cases based on group data, ranging 
from aerodynamics to zoology. Different fields have adapted 
strategies to respond to the evidentiary incommensurability 
challenge with differing degrees of success. In medical decision-
making, for example, evidence-based medicine is one way that 
doctors have sought to bring data to bear on individual 
diagnostic and therapeutic judgments.4 Meteorologists generate 
computer models that describe the likelihoods associated with 
a storm’s path and strength.5 At least from an outsider’s 
  
280 (2008); Scott I. Vrieze & William M. Grove, Predicting Sex Offender Recidivism, 32 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 266, 267 (2008). The problems of individualizing group data have 
also caught the attention of neuroscientists. See, e.g., Michael B. Miller et al., Extensive 
Individual Differences in Brain Activations Associated with Episodic Retrieval Are 
Reliable over Time, 14 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1200 (2002). On the issue more 
generally, see John A. Swets, Robyn M. Dawes & John Monahan, Better Decisions 
Through Science, 283 SCI. AM. 82 (2000). Ultimately, however, the question of 
individualizing group data for courtroom use is not simply a problem of inferential 
statistics. See David L. Faigman, The Limits of Science in the Courtroom, in BEYOND 
COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 303 (Eugene Borgida & 
Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008). 
 3 Professor Margaret Berger, to whom this Festschrift and this essay are 
dedicated, has devoted a substantial portion of her scholarship to navigating the 
intersection of law and science. The basic incompatibility between much of what 
science is able to offer and what most courts would like has been an abiding topic in 
her extraordinary scholarship. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General 
Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
2117, 2129-30 (1997); Margaret A. Berger & Lawrence M. Solan, The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Science and Law: An Essay and Introduction, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 
847, 852-53 (2008). 
 4 Daniel B. Mark, Decision-Making in Clinical Medicine, in 1 HARRISON’S 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 6, 6 (Dennis L. Kaspar et al. eds., 16th ed. 2005). 
 5 See, e.g., DAVID J. STENSRUD, PARAMETERIZATION SCHEMES: KEYS TO 
UNDERSTANDING NUMERICAL WEATHER PREDICTION MODELS (2007). 
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perspective, these efforts have not been so successful that 
courts would want to borrow them wholesale.6 
How, and whether, general data can be usefully 
employed to inform decisions about individual events is a 
problem that is central to the law’s function. In fact, courts are 
generally acquainted with the difficulties inherent in 
employing general scientific data to reach conclusions about 
specific cases. The primary area in which courts have 
considered this matter is in medical causation cases where they 
distinguish routinely between “general causation” and “specific 
causation.”7 Courts and legal scholars have not, however, 
engaged in a careful study of the details and intricacies 
associated with this matter across the wide spectrum of cases 
in which it presents itself. In addition, although the courts are 
passingly familiar with the problem of evidentiary 
incommensurability, they naturally approach the subject from 
their own need for information, with little appreciation for how 
and whether scientists can produce this information. Courts 
frequently demand empirical answers despite scientists’ 
inability to provide them.8 At the same time, scientists involved 
in the legal process naturally approach the problem of 
incommensurability from the perspective of their own desire to 
produce information, with little appreciation for how and 
whether the courts can effectively use this information.9 It is 
  
 6 For example, Dr. Jerome Groopman cautions against over-reliance on 
evidence-based medicine, fearing that it “risks having the physician choose passively, 
solely by the numbers,” rather than rely on the individual circumstances of each 
patient. JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 5-6 (2007). 
 7 See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW 
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 21:6-:7, at 27-45 (2008-2009 ed.) (listing cases). 
Not all science is engaged in describing cause and effect relationships, so “general 
causation” and “specific causation” are subcategories of what might more properly be 
labeled “general propositions” and “specific application.” Sometimes general 
propositions in science will be stated in causative terms, but very often they will be 
associational, technical, or descriptive. Specific application refers to the determination 
whether a particular case is an instance, use, or example of general propositions that 
are supported by research. 
 8 Among many possible examples that could be cited, possibly the most 
obvious is that of predicting violence. Courts call upon experts in myriad contexts to 
predict future behavior, from probation decisions to capital sentencing, though the best 
empirical research indicates that such expert opinions remain highly fallible. See John 
Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, 
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 405-07 (2006). 
 9 Scientists do not generally study how to “individualize” their findings in 
ways that would make them most helpful for legal usage. This is not meant as a 
criticism, only an observation. Especially in the social sciences, it is ordinarily 
sufficient to find a statistically significant effect among college sophomores. Little 
attention has been paid to how the variables studied might operate in a particular case. 
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hardly surprising that scientists should study the questions 
that they are most curious about and able to answer rather 
than those the law deems most relevant. In short, therefore, 
the two sides, law and science, perceive incommensurability 
from their separate vantage points, which largely perpetuates 
the problem. 
This essay jumps into the center of this conundrum. My 
objective, however, is somewhat unusual. It is a call to arms. I 
do not aim to resolve the incommensurability paradox, but 
rather to ring the fire-bell. Indeed, given the scope and depth of 
the obstacles presented by evidentiary incommensurability, it 
is a subject well beyond resolution in the pages provided to me 
here. My purpose, then, is to explore the paradox in the hope 
that it will help lay a common framework by which both 
lawyers and scientists might understand the challenges 
presented at the intersection of these two great professions. 
This essay, therefore, contemplates many of the sundry issues 
that would have to be reckoned with in any subsequent 
comprehensive effort to bring systematic rationality to the 
problem of employing group data to decide individual cases. It 
is divided into two parts. Part I considers scientific hypothesis 
testing and the inherent population focus of most of that work. 
While most scientific research focuses on a general population 
level analysis, results of that work can have very different 
levels of probative value in regard to informing decision-
making at the individual level. Part II examines evidentiary 
demands in the courtroom and the inherent individualized 
focus of that process. This part also considers some of the 
challenges inherent in any attempt to close the evidentiary 
incommensurability gap between what most science says and 
what most legal proceedings need to know. 
I. HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN SCIENCE 
Scientific research is most often conducted from a 
general and population-based perspective. This is a defining 
characteristic of the field. However, scientific methods, and the 
phenomena that scientists study, range widely. Inevitably, the 
demands of the empirical context dictate which set of research 
designs are, or might be, available. While studying the effects 
of depleted biodiversity in the Amazon rainforest and 
investigating the interaction between neuron and glial cells in 
a rat’s brain are both scientific endeavors, the methods 
involved are obviously disparate. Yet, from the law’s 
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perspective, there may be certain insights that persist across 
scientific domains in regard to individualizing group data. This 
section provides a preliminary sketch of the scientific 
landscape regarding whether certain common denominators 
might be identified within the process of bringing group data to 
bear on individual decisions. 
The essential question posed in the context of reasoning 
from the group to the individual is whether a particular case is 
an instance of the general phenomenon. If smoking causes lung 
cancer, the individualized query is whether a particular 
person’s lung cancer was caused by smoking. The degree to 
which scientific research might be relevant to resolving an 
individualized fact question varies from complete to not-at-all. 
In some areas, science might provide a definitive answer to the 
question of whether an individual case is an instance of a 
general phenomenon. If tobacco smoke is the only cause of lung 
cancer, we logically know that someone with lung cancer got 
sick from tobacco smoke. In other areas, science might help 
increase the accuracy of individual decision-making along a 
range of helpfulness, from nearly determinative to just above 
random chance. If tobacco smoke causes lung cancer, but many 
other things, known and unknown, do so as well, we cannot say 
with certainty that the person’s lung cancer was caused by 
tobacco smoke. The degree of certainty that the science 
provides, of course, is the operative question. Indeed, 
sometimes even very good science will not demonstrably 
improve the accuracy of individual decision-making, though it 
might nonetheless be relevant and admissible because it 
provides the triers of fact with contextual information that will 
help them understand other evidence in the case. 
A. When General Science Is Determinative in Particular 
Cases 
In practice, the law is interested not simply in whether 
a particular variable causes a particular effect, but, ultimately, 
in whether a particular variable did cause the effect.10 Scientific 
research will sometimes identify a single unidirectional 
relationship between two variables. In medicine, the term 
pathognomonic refers to a diagnostic version of this insight. A 
  
 10 This analysis simplifies matters considerably, since both the existence and 
extent of the cause, as well as the existence and extent of the effect, may be disputed in 
a particular case. 
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symptom is pathognomonic when it is “decisively characteristic 
of a disease.”11 For example, “Koplik’s spots . . . are 
pathognomonic of measles.”12 The strongest version of a path-
specific relationship would be the unusual situation where a 
cause and an effect are uniquely associated, such that the 
cause always produces the effect and the effect is always 
attributable to the cause. Outside of basic physics and 
chemistry, however, the strongest version of path-specificity 
will be quite rare. Nonetheless, such relationships are possible. 
This strong version could be termed cause/effect path-
specificity because the cause and the effect are uniquely tied to 
one another. 
The law is also interested in weaker versions of path-
specificity. For instance, a particular cause might always 
produce a particular effect, but other causes might produce 
similar effects. This could be termed causal path-specificity 
because the cause always produces a single effect, but other 
causes might produce the same effect. An example of this might 
be a lesion in a specific part of the brain that produces auditory 
hallucinations. Anyone with such a lesion would suffer from 
auditory hallucinations, but not all people with auditory 
hallucinations have a lesion in that region of the brain. 
Conversely, a particular effect might always be produced by a 
particular cause, but the cause does not invariably produce the 
effect. This could be termed effect path-specificity because the 
effect has a single cause, but the cause does not have a single 
effect. An example of this is the relationship between asbestos 
exposure and mesothelioma. The unique cause of mesothelioma 
is exposure to asbestos, but not everyone exposed to asbestos 
develops mesothelioma.13 
In legal proceedings, the strength and nature of path-
specificity is likely to be important. In general, cause/effect 
path-specificity will be the most probative kind of scientific 
evidence available. In contrast, the probative power of causal 
path-specificity or effect path-specificity will depend on the 
substantive law of the case. For example, in many criminal 
  
 11 Mondofacto Online Medical Dictionary, Pathognomonic, http://www. 
mondofacto.com/facts/dictionary?pathognomonic (last visited Jan. 16, 2010). 
 12 MedicineNet, Definition of Pathognomonic, http://www.medterms.com/ 
script/main/art.asp?articlekey=6386 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008). 
 13 Asbestos also causes other ailments, including lung cancer. See Piero 
Mustacchi, Lung Cancer Latency and Asbestos Liability, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 277, 280 
(1996). But, as mentioned, some people who are exposed to asbestos never get sick from 
it. 
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cases, the issue will be whether the defendant suffered the 
relevant effect, and it will not matter greatly that a variety of 
causes can produce it. In such cases, scientific evidence of 
causal path-specificity would strongly support the defendant’s 
case. This would be so in an insanity case in which evidence 
that the defendant has a brain lesion that invariably produces 
auditory hallucinations would be highly probative, despite the 
fact that other factors might cause the same symptoms. 
Conversely, in many civil cases, effect path-specificity will be 
the more probative kind of evidence. In the example of 
mesothelioma, a civil plaintiff who has this disease will be able 
to trace it back to asbestos exposure. In many civil cases, a 
substantial obstacle to a plaintiff’s recovery is showing that the 
effect he or she suffers from is attributable to the cause 
associated with the defendant. Effect path-specificity solves 
this difficulty. If the defendant was responsible for the 
plaintiff’s asbestos exposure, then the plaintiff’s mesothelioma 
is attributable to the defendant. 
B. When General Science Is Probative, but Not 
Determinative, in Particular Cases 
In most applied science contexts, path-specificity is not 
possible, either because it does not exist in actuality or because 
scientists’ methods are unable to identify those cases in which 
it does exist. In most areas of interest to the law, scientific 
research provides knowledge about cause and effect 
relationships generally, but will be only more or less 
determinate on the question of whether a specific instance of 
an effect is attributable to a specific cause, or that a specific 
cause contributed to a particular effect. In this vast domain, 
applied scientific research comes in myriad forms and its value 
for deciding individual cases varies greatly. In some situations, 
the science will be nearly definitive regarding a specific cause 
and effect relation and in others it will do little more than 
increase the likelihood that a relevant relationship exists 
slightly above chance. 
As is true with the concept of path-specificity discussed 
in the previous section, indeterminate scientific research might 
be relevant in legal proceedings in three separately identifiable 
ways, regarding (1) effect only, because the cause is known (or 
can be assumed), (2) cause only, because the effect is known (or 
can be assumed), or (3) both cause and effect. As will become 
clear in the discussion that follows, the intended purpose for 
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which the science is to be used is associated with the demands 
that courts place on the science itself. 
In many legal contexts, only the effect is relevant 
because the causal variable is fairly known or is assumed. 
Indeed, one of the best known subjects in law and psychology 
fits this category: eyewitness identification. In eyewitness 
identification research, researchers have found that certain 
factors interfere with accuracy, such as presence of a weapon, 
cross-race identifications, and use of leading questions by 
interviewers.14 In this example, the causal side of the equation 
is the independent variable, which is more or less known or 
assumed to be present in the case. The focus, therefore, is 
principally on what effect this causal variable has had. Hence, 
if the witness is white and the perpetrator is black, the 
empirical crux of the matter concerns what effect this causal 
variable has on the accuracy of the identification. Other 
examples in which the effects are relevant and the cause is 
known or assumed include the effects of hypnosis on memory,15 
the impact of putatively prejudicial photographs or images on 
fact finders’ judgments,16 and the effect of violent television on 
viewers.17 
In effect-relevant cases—that is, where the cause is 
known or assumed and the effects have been the subject of 
research—the science is rarely employed to do more than 
provide general insights about those who have experienced the 
causal variable of interest. It may very well be, for instance, 
that when a gun is present, eyewitness identifications are on 
average less accurate than when one is not; but this finding 
provides very little information regarding whether any 
particular identification is accurate. In the law, general 
research findings might very well be relevant and admissible to 
inform the jury of factors that might interfere with a witness’s 
accurate recall, which the jury could use or ignore as it deemed 
  
 14 See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Scientific Status, in 2 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra 
note 7, at 520, 534-47 (Faigman et al. eds., 2009). 
 15 See Michael Nash & Robert Nadon, Hypnosis: Scientific Status, in 2 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra 
note 7, at 733. 
 16 David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and 
Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183 (2006). 
 17 Kevin D. Browne & Catherine Hamilton-Giachritsis, The Influence of 
Violent Media on Children and Adolescents: A Public-Health Approach, 365 LANCET 
702, 702 (2005). 
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fit. The science in this case, however, says very little about 
eyewitness identification. 
The second category, and one that arises often in court, 
is when the effect is fairly known (or can be assumed), and the 
science is offered to demonstrate the cause of that effect. Whole 
areas of medical and psychological causation fit this category, 
as do some areas of forensic science. In medical causation, a 
plaintiff might be known to have leukemia (i.e., the effect) and 
the scientifically controverted issue will be whether one 
variable (e.g., trichloroethylene) or another caused the illness. 
In psychological causation, the same analysis applies. For 
example, a witness who suffers from Post-traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) might claim that it was caused by a sexual 
assault rather than other causes, such as a failed marriage and 
a lost job. Finally, some areas of forensic science fit this cause-
relevant category. The best example is arson investigation. In 
the ordinary arson case, the effect is known (i.e., a burned or 
exploded structure), but the science is offered to demonstrate 
the cause (e.g., purposely set using some incendiary device or 
material). 
When the proffered science is relevant to the cause of 
some known effect, it is ultimately meant to operate 
diagnostically in regard to the individual case at hand. This 
category presents the most classic manifestation of the 
challenges associated with reasoning from group data to 
decisions in individual cases. In many areas, the research 
provides substantial evidence of a general connection between 
variables, but the science does not pave a direct path to 
extrapolating from the general data to the individual case. 
Ordinarily, some additional method is used to bring the general 
science to the individual case, usually labeled vaguely as 
“differential diagnosis” or “differential etiology.”18 This issue is 
considered in Part II, infra. 
The third and final category of scientific relevance is 
something of a catch-all, and involves those cases in which the 
science informs both the causal and the effect sides of the 
equation. In other words, in this category the situation or 
context is argued to have legal significance, but the science is 
necessary to show how or why this is so. Many psychological 
claims fall into this category, as do most of the forensic 
identification technologies. A good example of the former is 
  
 18 See generally FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 27-49. 
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research on predictions of violence. The matter of predicting 
violence has wide significance in the law, and scientists have 
sought to provide guidance on this issue by relating one set of 
variables (i.e., predictors) to another variable (i.e., future 
violence). Neither the “cause” nor the “effect” is known outside 
of the applicable research. Most forensic identification 
technologies operate similarly. Scientific research on DNA 
profiling, for instance, describes both the existence of the 
phenomenon as well as the significance of that phenomenon for 
legal decision-making. Significantly, both actuarial predictions 
of violence and DNA profiling are framed generally, and, to the 
extent that they are applied to individual cases, the proffered 
opinions ordinarily remain in their general population-based 
form.19 
In the end, law and science are separate disciplines and, 
though they often share goals or objectives, neither is nor 
should be expected to be the other’s handmaiden. It is hardly 
surprising, therefore, that the methods of science do not 
correspond neatly to the needs of the law. Yet, nonetheless, at 
least in a preliminary way, it is possible to identify general 
pathways of scientific investigation and consider how they 
sometimes might, but oftentimes do not, provide the answers to 
the questions the law poses. Understanding the parameters of 
the scientific enterprise, however, is only the first step in 
improving the law’s use of research data. Much of the 
information the law needs from science does not fit neatly into 
conventional modes of empirical inquiry. Whereas scientists 
ordinarily study causes and effects in populations, courts 
ordinarily need to determine causes and effects in particular 
individuals. The next section examines the difficulties endemic 
to developing a rigorous individual-based empiricism. 
  
 19 See Helena Kraemer et al., Coming to Terms With the Terms of Risk, 54 
ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 337, 340 (1997). It should be noted that very often 
predictions of violence opinions are not based on scientific research at all. Many, if not 
most opinions offered in court on this subject, are based on clinical judgment, and they 
are presented accordingly as conclusions about a particular person. On the value of 
clinical versus actuarial predictions of violence, see Stefania Aegisdottir, The Meta-
Analysis of Clinical Judgment Project: Fifty-Six Years of Accumulated Research on 
Clinical Versus Actuarial Predictions of Violence, 34 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 400 
(2006). 
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II. FRAMING EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS IN THE COURTROOM 
The basic perspective of most courtroom proceedings is 
individual and specific. Courts look to answer such questions 
as whether the defendant killed the victim, the plaintiff’s 
leukemia was caused by a chemical produced by the defendant, 
the juvenile defendant is competent to be tried as an adult, the 
capital defendant is likely to be violent if not executed, and so 
forth. While the ultimate issue in most legal proceedings 
involves the determination of a particular fact (or facts), courts 
well understand that underlying these specific questions is 
knowledge about the general world. Hence, a defendant’s guilt 
might depend on the general match probabilities of DNA 
evidence, and a plaintiff’s civil claim against a chemical 
manufacturer might depend partly on epidemiological studies 
showing an association between the alleged offending chemical 
and leukemia. Tackling the complex challenge of integrating 
scientific research into legal decision-making would be helped 
considerably if there were a vocabulary that permitted 
categorization of the different ways science might be relevant 
to legal decision-making. There has been no shortage of 
attempts at providing such a taxonomy.20 
A. Taxonomies of Fact-Finding 
The first, and still most influential, taxonomy of fact-
finding in law was offered by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis.21 
Davis distinguished between what he termed legislative facts 
and adjudicative facts. Legislative facts are those facts that 
transcend the particular dispute and are relevant to legal 
reasoning and the fashioning of legal rules.22 Adjudicative facts, 
in contrast, are those facts particular to the dispute.23 
In a series of influential articles in the 1980s, Professors 
John Monahan and Laurens Walker refined Davis’ dichotomy 
in a manner that more fully captures the ways that science is 
  
 20 I too have participated in this endeavor, though my efforts were restricted 
to constitutional cases. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED 
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 43-62 (2008). 
 21 Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the 
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942). 
 22 Id. at 402; see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(a), Advisory Committee’s Note 
(“Legislative facts . . . are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the 
lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge 
or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.”). 
 23 Davis, supra note 21, at 402. 
1126 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
used in the courtroom.24 Their primary focus was on the law’s 
use of social science. They identified three levels of convergence 
between social science and law: social authority, social facts, 
and social frameworks. Social authority refers to social science 
research relevant to the determination of legislative facts and 
thus the formulation of legal rules.25 According to their 
proposal, social authority is analogous to legal authority and 
should be consulted similarly. Hence, judges would consider 
social science “precedent” (i.e., past research) as presented 
through briefs, arguments, and sua sponte.26 The information 
found to be relevant and valid would then be incorporated into 
the judge’s conclusions of law. Alternatively, in the Monahan-
Walker model, social science research might be relevant to 
adjudicative facts (what they call “social facts”), in which case, 
after being deemed admissible, it would be presented to the 
trier of fact through expert testimony.27 Finally, social science 
research might have relevance as a combination of social 
authority and adjudicative fact. Professors Monahan and 
Walker label this use “social frameworks,” where some issue in 
the particular dispute is claimed to be an instance of a social 
scientific finding or theory of general import.28 
The Monahan-Walker model, though framed to deal 
with their subject of interest (social science), nicely captures 
the three basic divisions of fact-finding that courts must 
process. Most importantly, their social framework category is a 
significant leap forward in clarifying the challenges associated 
with integrating empirical research into legal decision-making. 
Indeed, arguably the social authority (i.e., legislative facts) and 
social facts (i.e., adjudicative facts) are merely components of 
  
 24 John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, 
Evaluating and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986) 
[hereinafter Monahan & Walker (1986)]; Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social 
Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877 (1988) 
[hereinafter Walker & Monahan (1988)]; Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social 
Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987) 
[hereinafter Walker & Monahan (1987)]. 
 25 Walker & Monahan (1987), supra note 24, at 562. 
 26 Monahan & Walker (1986), supra note 24, at 490-91. 
 27 Walker & Monahan (1988), supra note 24, at 887. 
 28 Walker & Monahan (1987), supra note 24, at 563-67. According to 
Monahan and Walker’s social framework model, the judge would consider and instruct 
the jury on the accuracy of the general claim, but the jury would also hear expert 
testimony on how the research applies to the case before it. Id. at 592. In traditional 
practice, however, the jury is the fact finder for both components of social framework 
evidence. For present purposes, I need not choose which procedural approach is the 
better one. 
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social frameworks, with the latter two being defined as a 
function of the legal use for evidence, not its scientific nature. 
In other words, all empirical research is conceivable in terms of 
frameworks, because it invariably has both a general 
component and a specific component. Whether the general 
component is legally relevant at all and, if so, what it is 
relevant to prove, dictates in the Monahan-Walker model 
whether it is a “social authority” or “social framework.” For 
example, consider the empirical question of the developmental 
competence of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. In the context 
of capital punishment, this general fact was used in Roper v. 
Simmons29 to support the conclusion that applying the death 
penalty to those who killed before reaching the age of majority 
was unconstitutional. As such, this legislative fact was 
informed by “social authority.” On the other hand, if the 
question was whether a particular sixteen- or seventeen-year-
old had competently waived his Miranda rights, the research 
used in Roper would be employed to inform a “social 
framework.”30 In the case involving the waiving of Miranda 
rights, the court would have to apply the framework to the 
individual case, thus paradigmatically using both components 
of Monahan and Walker’s social framework category. 
B. Empirical Frameworks 
For the purpose of examining evidentiary 
incommensurability between law and science, the Monahan 
and Walker concept of social frameworks is all that is 
specifically needed. It fully captures the juxtaposition of the 
inordinate empirical difficulties surrounding the use of group 
data to make individual decisions, and the law’s frequent need 
to do just that. Since the phenomenon of interest extends well 
beyond social science, and includes all applied science with 
policy implications, the term “empirical framework” is more 
accurate and will be used here. The following sections, 
therefore, consider the legal demands on empirical research, 
from both the more conciliatory use of general research data to 
answer general legal propositions, to the more demanding use 
of general data to reach individualized judgments. 
  
 29 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 30 See, e.g., Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: 
An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1980). 
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C. Defining the “Frame” 
Because ordinary science operates at the general level of 
descriptive and inferential statistics, it can be readily employed 
to determine general propositions. Consider, for example, a 
hypothesis that has been the subject of several legal cases: 
violent video games cause minors who play them to be violent 
and asocial. This hypothesis has been studied in a multitude of 
ways, including observational case studies, correlational 
studies, laboratory experiments, brain imaging, and so forth.31 
If these differing methods point in the same direction, then 
some general conclusions might be made regarding the 
relationship between violent video games and violence among 
children. If they point in different directions, of course, the task 
is complicated greatly, if not made impossible, until more 
research is done. But even when the body of research is robust, 
conclusions are likely to be tentative and, at best, described in 
probabilistic terms. 
The legal relevance of the science, however uncertainly 
known, depends on the substantive law of the case. In regard to 
the violent video game example, then, this hypothesis might be 
relevant as a general proposition—e.g., do violent video games 
lead to increased violence among children—or as that research 
might apply in a particular case—e.g., was the minor-
defendant’s violent action attributable to having played violent 
video games. 
In the law, most litigation tends to involve the 
application of general principles to a specific case. Frequently, 
however, a general proposition of science is itself at issue. A 
good example of this, coming from the violence in media 
example, is the case Entertainment Software Association v. 
Blagojevich.32 In Entertainment Software, several video 
industry trade associations sued the State to enjoin the 
enforcement of two statutes that regulated the content of 
violent and sexually explicit videos. The plaintiffs argued that 
the State’s laws violated the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment. The district court agreed that the laws implicated 
First Amendment rights and held that the legislation could 
survive only if the State had a compelling interest that would 
be substantially achieved by the laws. The court found that 
  
 31 See generally Craig A. Anderson, An Update on the Effects of Playing 
Violent Video Games, 27 J. ADOLESCENCE 113 (2004) (reviewing the literature). 
 32 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
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“[t]he Illinois General Assembly’s main justifications . . . were 
three legislative findings about the effect of playing video 
games on minors’ physiological and neurological 
development.”33 According to the court, the legislature believed 
that playing violent video games makes children (1) “exhibit 
violent, asocial, or aggressive behavior”; (2) “[e]xperience 
feelings of aggression”; and (3) “[e]xperience a reduction of 
activity in the frontal lobes of the brain which is responsible for 
controlling behavior.”34 In concluding that Illinois had not met 
its considerable burden, the court extensively reviewed 
psychological and neurological research that had been 
advanced by the State. The court explained that the State 
“failed to present substantial evidence showing that playing 
violent video games causes minors to have aggressive feelings 
or engage in aggressive behavior.”35 Moreover, the court stated 
that “there is barely any evidence at all, let alone substantial 
evidence, showing that playing violent video games causes 
minors to ‘experience a reduction of activity in the frontal lobes 
of the brain which is responsible for controlling behavior.’”36 
The court permanently enjoined the Illinois law. 
The second hypothesis, that a particular minor’s violent 
action is attributable to having played violent video games, is 
the more typical courtroom situation in regard to scientific 
evidence. In these cases, both the general hypothesis and the 
specific hypothesis are at issue. Although the defense is 
unusual, defendants have on occasion argued insanity on the 
basis of video programming.37 In Zamora v. State,38 for example, 
“Zamora’s insanity defense was based upon ‘involuntary 
subliminal television intoxication.’” In particular, defense 
counsel argued that violent television had a noxious influence 
on sociopathic children and that Zamora had killed as a 
consequence of this effect.39 To support this theory, the defense 
  
 33 Id. at 1073. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 1074 (The court added that, “[a]t most, researchers have been able to 
show a correlation between playing violent video games and a slightly increased level 
of aggressive thoughts and behavior.”). 
 36 Id. 
 37 See generally Jonathan Chananie, Violent Videogames, Crime, and the 
Law: Looking for Proof of a Causal Connection, 26 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 27, 43 
(2007) (listing cases); Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon 
the Toxicity of the Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and 
Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV. 731 (1996) (same). 
 38 361 So. 2d 776, 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
 39 Id.  
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offered two experts. The first, a psychologist, offered to testify 
to the effect of television on adolescents generally.40 A second 
expert, a psychiatrist, testified that the defendant “did not 
know right from wrong” when he “fired the fatal shot,” thus 
applying the general theory of the case to the particular 
defendant. The court excluded the psychologist on the ground 
that she could not speak to Zamora’s individual case. The 
psychiatrist testified at trial, but apparently to little effect, 
since Zamora was convicted. 
In the courtroom, research on general propositions, such 
as whether violent media causes an increase in violence among 
children, addresses a threshold question and one which 
scientists are trained to address. In an insanity defense to 
murder, however, the question is whether the particular 
person’s violence was caused by exposure to violent media. This 
issue of specific application poses a complex and difficult 
cognitive exercise. Moreover, it is an exercise that varies in 
different empirical contexts. It is also a subject that has been 
substantially ignored by scientists interested in the courtroom 
use of their data. 
D. Reasoning to the Specific 
Although the challenge of reasoning from general 
research data to individual cases has been considered in a 
fairly cursory manner by courts and legal scholars, the basic 
challenges are fairly easily summarized. This is especially so in 
the conventional toxic tort litigation context, the area in which 
courts have most often considered it. In a nutshell, the first 
task is to demonstrate that the substance could have caused 
the ailment (i.e., the validity of the general proposition); the 
second task is to show both that it probably did, and that other 
substances probably did not, cause the plaintiff’s condition.  
The simplest case of this reasoning process might 
involve general research that indicates that some substance 
causes an ailment that is uniquely associated with that 
substance. For instance, as noted in Part I, asbestos has been 
shown to cause mesothelioma and it is the only substance 
known to cause it.41 Since mesothelioma is a “signature 
disease,” the only question concerns the circumstances of the 
  
 40 Id. 
 41 Victor Roggli, Asbestos: Scientific Status, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 7, at § 26. 
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individual’s exposure to asbestos (i.e., was the defendant 
responsible), not whether exposure caused the condition. The 
cause and effect path-specificity operates in this example to 
permit straightforward logical deductions from the general 
data to individual cases. This is rare in toxic tort litigation. For 
example, in contrast to asbestos, while second-hand smoke has 
been linked to lung cancer, many other substances are known 
to cause lung cancer. Hence, in regard to identifying the cause 
of a person’s lung cancer, an expert must not only rule-in 
smoking as a possible cause, but also rule-out other possible 
causes.42 
The principal tool used to move from general research 
findings to statements about individual cases is “differential 
etiology,” sometimes misleadingly referred to as “differential 
diagnosis.” Properly understood, differential diagnosis refers to 
the identification of the illness or behavioral condition that a 
person is experiencing. Differential etiology refers to the cause 
or causes of that condition. Hence, the determination that a 
person suffers from “dissociative amnesia” and not “dissociative 
fugue” is a diagnostic issue.43 The determination that a sexual 
assault at age ten caused the diagnosed dissociative amnesia, 
and that it did not result from a medical condition or physical 
trauma, is an etiological matter. Very different skill sets are 
usually involved in these two determinations. Indeed, the DSM 
explicitly eschews any claim of the etiological verity of its 
diagnostic categories.44 It is worth emphasizing, as well, that 
the validity of the diagnosis of dissociative amnesia is a matter 
of general research. The entire process of differential diagnosis 
and differential etiology assumes that the designated category 
has adequate empirical support in the first place as a general 
proposition. Hence, although it is logically obvious, it should be 
stated plainly that an expert should never be permitted to 
testify about a specific application of a general proposition if 
research does not adequately support the general proposition. 
In the professional practice of both clinical medicine and 
clinical psychology, the primary concern is diagnosis and not 
etiology. An oncologist might be curious about what caused his 
or her patient’s leukemia, but the doctor’s first task is to 
  
 42 Faigman et al., Tobacco: Legal Issues, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: 
THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 7. 
 43 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS §§ 300.12-.13 (4th ed., text revision 2000). 
 44 Id. at xxxvii. 
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diagnose and treat the condition, not determine whether it was 
caused by trichloroethylene, benzene, electromagnetic fields, or 
something else. Similarly, a psychologist treating a person 
thought to suffer from either Post-traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) or adjustment disorder is primarily concerned with 
identifying and treating the condition, not determining the true 
causes of that condition. In the ordinary practice of clinical 
medicine and clinical psychology, treatment and therapy are 
the principal objectives, not assessing cause. A person 
presenting symptoms associated with PTSD, therefore, may 
claim that the traumatic event was a sexual assault committed 
by her uncle. From the therapeutic standpoint, at least at the 
start, the important factor is that there was a traumatic event. 
Whether the patient’s uncle was the cause need not be 
specifically resolved for diagnostic purposes. In the law, of 
course, who caused the traumatic event is the crux of the 
matter. Hence, the core nature of much clinical practice is at 
right angles to the crux of most legal inquiries. 
In the courtroom, differential etiology is the operative 
issue. Moreover, the same basic principle is implicated, 
whether the expert opinion comes from research-based science 
or clinical practice (i.e., “experience”). Indeed, at least 
superficially, the former suffers a comparative disadvantage, 
since the research tradition does not ordinarily purport to offer 
conclusive statements about individual cases. Research, for 
example, might identify factors highly associated with false 
confessions, but these general propositions are some distance 
from what is needed to allow experts to opine regarding the 
truth or falsity of any particular confession. Clinicians at least 
have a history of applying general knowledge to individual 
cases, though, as noted, while this practice might be well 
accepted for therapeutic purposes, its validity for forensic ends 
is somewhat doubtful. Whether researchers or clinicians have 
the wherewithal to help triers of fact in applying general 
research propositions to specific cases is a threshold legal 
matter that should depend on the reliability and validity of the 
differential etiology done in the respective case. It may be, that 
is, that in vast areas of clinical practice there is no general 
research foundation in the first instance. And, as stated above, 
if research does not support a general proposition—say, the 
phenomenon of repressed memories—then clinical expert 
testimony that a particular person has repressed certain 
memories of early sexual abuse cannot be sustained. 
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E. Differential Etiology 
Differential etiology is a reasoning process that involves 
a multitude of factors, few of which are easily quantified. An 
expert offering an opinion regarding a specific case must first 
consider the strength of the evidence for the general 
proposition being applied in the case. If the claim is that 
substance X caused plaintiff’s condition Y, the initial inquiry 
must concern the strength of the relationship between X and Y 
as a general proposition. For example, both second-hand smoke 
and first-hand smoke are associated with lung cancer, but the 
strength of the relationship generally is much stronger for the 
latter than it is for the former. The inquiry regarding strength 
of relationship will depend on many factors, including, among 
other things, the statistical strength of any claims and the 
quality of the methods used in the research. Additionally, the 
general model must consider the strength of the evidence for 
alternative possible causes of Y and the strength of their 
respective relationships (and possibly interactions with other 
factors). Again, the quality of the research and the different 
methodologies employed will make comparisons difficult. 
Complicating matters further regarding identification of 
potential causes of condition Y are the myriad of possible 
causes that have not been studied, or have been studied 
inadequately.45 Hence, determining the contours of the general 
model is a dicey affair in itself, since it requires combining 
disparate research results and discounting those results by an 
unknown factor associated with additional variables not yet 
studied. And this is just the first part of the necessary analysis 
if the expert wants to give an opinion about an individual case. 
The second part of the analysis—specific application of 
general propositions that are themselves supported by 
adequate research—requires two abilities, neither of which are 
clearly within most scientists’ skill sets. The first, and perhaps 
less problematic, is that of forensic investigator. Almost no 
matter what the empirical relationship, whether medical or 
psychological, exposure or dosage levels will be relevant to the 
diagnosis. The first principle of toxicology is that “the dose 
  
 45 In Henricksen v. Conocophilips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (E.D. Wash. 
2009), the court observed that eighty to ninety percent of the causes of acute 
myelogenous leukemia (AML) were unknown (“ideopathic”). Id. at 1149. The court 
stated that “[i]f 90 percent of the causes of a disease are unknown, it is impossible to 
eliminate an unknown disease as the efficient cause of a patient’s illness.” Id. at 1162 
(quoting Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 21 n.41 (D. Mass. 1995)). 
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makes the poison,” since any substance in sufficient quantities 
could injure or kill someone.46 Similarly, in a wide variety of 
psychological contexts, the exposure or dose will be the poison. 
For instance, degree of trauma affects diagnostic categorization 
between PTSD and adjustment disorder, level of anxiety affects 
eyewitness identifications, amount of lack of sleep affects false 
confession rates, and so on. The expert testifying to specific 
causation must determine exposure and dosage levels for the 
suspected cause (i.e., the source suspected by the client) as well 
as for all other known or possible causes. This task is difficult 
enough alone, but is enormously complicated by the significant 
potential for recall bias, given that the litigation will be 
profoundly affected by what is recalled. 
The second skill set that is needed has not yet been 
invented or even described with precision. Somehow, the 
diagnostician must combine the surfeit of information 
concerning the multitude of factors that make up the general 
model, combine it with the case history information known or 
suspected about the individual, and offer an opinion with some 
level of confidence that substance or experience X was the 
likely cause of condition Y. In practice, this opinion is usually 
stated as follows: “Within a reasonable degree of 
medical/psychological certainty, it is my opinion that X caused 
[a particular case of] Y.” This expression has no empirical 
meaning and is simply a mantra repeated by experts for 
purposes of legal decision makers who similarly have no idea 
what it means. But even less extreme versions of this 
statement—such as, “It is more likely than not true that this 
case is an instance of some general phenomenon”—are 
objectionable. Just how, for instance, would an eyewitness 
researcher determine that a witness was more likely than not 
inaccurate when the witness made a cross-racial identification 
of the defendant after seeing the unarmed perpetrator for five 
minutes under a streetlight from an unobstructed view twenty 
feet away from the crime? There are no data that would 
support psychologists’ ability to make such statements, 
however modest or innocuous they may appear. Experts’ case-
specific conclusions appear to be based largely on an admixture 
of an unknown combination of knowledge of the subject, 
  
 46 Bernbard D. Goldstein & Russellyn Carruth, Toxicology: Scientific Status, 
in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, 
supra note 7, at § 22. 
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experience over the years, commitment to the client or cause, 
intuition, and blind-faith. Science it is not.  
Whether, and in what way, particular scientific findings 
are relevant to legal decision-making depends on the 
substantive law of the case. Frequently, the relevant factual 
issue under applicable law involves general propositions, ones 
that population-based research corresponds to directly. Much 
more often, however, the empirical focus of the ultimate legal 
issue is on the particular case. But conventional scientific 
methods do not share this focus. Although research data might 
demonstrate with high confidence that a particular variable 
has an effect of interest, it typically cannot demonstrate with 
the same confidence that the particular variable had the effect 
of interest in a particular case. Reconciling this evidentiary 
incommensurability between what science ordinarily does and 
what the law ordinarily needs is, as yet, one of the great unmet 
challenges at the intersection of science and the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Most evidentiary codes require that expert testimony 
“assist the trier of fact” in order for it to be admissible.47 
Scientific expert testimony, however, must be legally relevant 
and have evidentiary reliability (i.e., scientific validity).48 
Moreover, expert opinion must offer insights beyond what 
triers of fact could do on their own. Put another way, scientist-
experts are limited to testifying about what their respective 
field’s research can validly add to fact-finders’ deliberations—
and nothing more. This injunction, however, is not always 
followed. In particular, experts frequently seek to comment not 
simply on the import of general research findings, but on 
whether a particular case fits those findings. Scientific 
research that permits a valid description of a general 
phenomenon, however, does not invariably give experts the 
capacity to validly determine whether an individual case is an 
instance of that general phenomenon. 
A basic difference in perspective between science and 
the law is that science studies individuals in order to make 
statements about populations, while the law studies 
populations in order to make statements about individuals. It 
  
 47 FED. R. OF EVID. 702. 
 48 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993). 
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does not necessarily follow that a scientist who can validly 
describe a general phenomenon also has the wherewithal to say 
whether an individual case is an instance of that general 
phenomenon. In many respects, the matter of translating 
scientific research findings into helpful information for fact-
finders in court should be a subject of first concern for applied 
science. Yet this issue has been largely ignored by scientists. 
This essay calls for a broadly conceived collaborative effort to 
consider this basic issue, one that is endemic to the intersection 
of law and science. 
